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The United States Supreme Court
and Business Elites: Gilded Age





1 Although   historians   disagree   about   how   to   define   and   describe   the   Gilded  Age,
everyone agrees that it was an era of commercial revolution. In this sense it is often
seen as an age of accomplishment and as the birth of modern America. It has also been
portrayed  as  an  age  of  corruption,  greed,  and   inequality,  both   in  government  and
business.  Whichever   characteristic  any  given  historian  emphasizes,  however,  most
agree that it was an age of enterprise. The predominant attitude toward business at the
time favored free enterprise in the extreme. Moreover it was supported by an economic
philosophy   that,   whether   called   classical   liberalism,   laissez-faire   economics,   the
neutral  state,  or  entrepreneurial  liberty,  emphasized  a  society  founded  on  a  limited
role of government in guiding or regulating economic activity. 






that  question   is  that  modern  brand  of  American   liberalism  originated  much  earlier
than the Gilded Age. Most agree with the eminent legal historian Morton Horwitz, who
maintains  not  only   that   the   idea  of  a  neutral   state  or   liberal   state   triumphed   in
American  political   thought,  but  also   that   it  predominated  American  constitutional
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doctrine  almost  from  the  time  of the  founding of  the  country  (Horwitz,  1987).  Thus,
emphasizing   a   traditional   American   tendency   to   distrust   government,   today’s
conventional  narrative  depicts   constitutional  history   as  having  developed   along   a
straight  line :  always  with  an  emphasis  on  individual  liberty.  It  treats  the  issue  as  a
matter  of  balancing  entrepreneurial   liberty  or  property  rights  against  state  power,
with a presumption that entrepreneurial liberty should be favored over government’s
power   to  regulate   (McCurdy,  1975,  Gillman,  1993,  Gold,  1990,  Benedict  1985,   Jones,
1967). 
4 This paper  will use  the  1877  case  Munn v. Illinois as a lens through which to  take a
fresh   look   at   the   development   of   constitutional   doctrine   governing   economic
regulation.   I  hope   to  demonstrate   that   the  emphasis  on  entrepreneurial   liberty   is
actually   a   product   of   the  Gilded  Age.   Prior   to   the   late   1880s   the   paradigm   for
determining   the   constitution’s   limits   on   government   regulation   of   business   was
actually  quite  different.  There   is  no doubt   that   the  Court  has  always  emphatically
recognized  the  importance  of  property  rights.  Nevertheless,  during  the  first  century
under   the   Constitution,   it   treated   business   regulation   as   a   matter   of   balancing
entrepreneurial   liberty   against   the   rights   of   the   community.   Furthermore,   it





charge  for  storage.  The  firm  of  Munn  and  Scott,  which  owned  one  of  the  elevators,
complained that the state’s regulation of the rates they could charge deprived them of
their liberty and property without due process of law, and thus violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.  The  Supreme  Court  disagreed.  Writing   for   the  majority,  Chief   Justice
Morrison R. Waite reasoned that states could regulate “businesses affected with public
interest.”   While   doing   so,   however,   Waite   conceded   that   even   though   statutes
regulating  the  use  of  private  property  do  not  necessarily  deprive  the  owner  of  due




the   state   in   providing   for   the   general  welfare   and   protecting   the   rights   of   the
community.
6 That debate secured Munn’s place in history. According to the conventional narrative,
Munn plays  a   significant   role  as  a   steppingstone   in   the   straight-line  evolution  of
constitutional doctrine that emphasizes entrepreneurial liberty. Waite’s concession and
Field’s  dissent   laid   the   foundation   for   an   era  of   constitutional  history   sometimes
referred  to  as  the   laissez-faire era.  Although  the  most   fundamental  meaning  of  due
process was that no person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the
benefit  of  proper   judicial  hearing  and  procedure,  Waite  and  Field  are  said  to  have
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become constitutional doctrine in the mid-1890s and predominate until 1937 (Wiecek,
1998,   112).  At   its  high  point   the  Court   applied   a  presumption   that,   in  order   for
economic regulation to be constitutional, a state must demonstrate that the regulation











face  of  persistent  efforts  on   the  part  of   lawyers   for  Gilded  Age  corporate  elites   to
change   traditional   constitutional   doctrine.   Their   campaign   to   change   traditional
doctrine   involved :   maintaining   that   government   regulation   of   business   was   the
equivalent to confiscation of property, expanding the constitutional rights afforded to





Background to the Munn Decision
8 The dispute of which the Granger Cases were a part was shaped in large degree by rapid
changes in the economic and social landscape. America in the late 1870s was evolving
from   a   predominantly   local   economic   system   to   one   that   was   national   and
interconnected.  It  was  a  revolution  in commerce  that  entirely  changed  the  way  that




9 Chicago’s   grain   elevators  were   both   a   product   and   a   symbol   of   the   commercial
revolution that was taking place in the late 19th century. In this system of commerce
the sale and storage of grain was not a local transaction as it had been in the past. Most
of   the  grain  produced   in   the  Midwest   in   the   I870s  made   its  way   to   the  Chicago
lakefront.  There  it  was  held  for  shipment  via the  Great  Lakes  or  railroad  to  Eastern







railroad  routes,  allowed  buyers  to  hold  their  grain  hoping   for  the  highest  price.   It
essentially  created  a  new  business  of  speculating   in  grain  futures.  With  speculation
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affecting the price of grain, farmers, whose livelihood had always been at the mercy of
factors  beyond   their  control,  now   faced   still  another  obstacle   that   seemed   just  as
unpredictable as the weather (Cronon, 1991).
11 Adding  to  the  farmers’  dissatisfaction  was  the  fact  that  cooperation  among  the  nine
Chicago firms allowed them to fix the prices they charged for storage of grain, farmers
pushed   for  regulation  of  Chicago’s  grain  elevators.  But  collusion  was  not   the  only
complaint leveled against the elevators and the farmers were not the only group calling
for  regulation.  Complaints  also  came  from  shippers  who  claimed  that  the  elevators
often under-weighed their shipments and undervalued the quality of their grain. They
also  came   from   traders   in  grain   futures.  For   them   the  elevator   firms’  practice  of
overstating   the  amount  and  quality  of  grain   they  held,  and   their   refusal   to  allow














14 The  Granger  movement  grew  at  an  astonishing  rate,  and  in  1873  and  1874 farmers’
organizations   placed   a   significant   number   of   sympathetic   representatives   in   the
legislatures  of   Illinois,   Iowa,  Minnesota,   and  Wisconsin.  Working  with  merchants,
shippers, and civic leaders they helped enact laws that created railroad commissions to
regulate railroads, prohibited railroads from discriminating among customers, and set
maximum  rates  railroads  and  grain  warehouses  could  charge  for  their  services. The
Grangers influence in passing reform legislation has probably been exaggerated (Miller,




merchant,   the  shipper,  or   the   farmer  may  not  have  been  able   to  articulate   in   the
language   of   economics   their   complaints   about   railroad   ratemaking,   but   they
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facilities   that   mixed   one   farmer’s   produce   with   another’s   allowed   financiers   to







17 Reformers  intuitively  understood  that  individuals  could  not  achieve  that  fairness  or
take back control of their economic destiny on their own. Granger leader D.W. Adams
told his followers that against the railroads, “the people, in their individual capacity,







draymen   (truckers),   taverns,   inns,   and  various  professions  were   just   some  of   the
businesses   that   states   commonly   regulated   (Novak,1996).   The   pervasiveness   of




practices ran  afoul of American society’s traditional respect  for the  rights  of private
property. It is because of this that the Granger laws and the Granger Cases are often





of  the  Age  of  Jackson  –  the  pre-Civil  War  years  in  which  most  reformers  as  well  as
railroad leaders came of age. By choosing a paradigm that pitted government power
against  property   rights,   railroad  advocates  and  opponents  of   regulation   sought   to
emphasize that tradition and cast regulation in the worst possible light.
 




however.  Reformers   saw   it  more  as  a  matter  of  weighing  an   individual’s  claim  of
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canals,  or  public  warehouses,   limiting  the  state’s  borrowing  authority,  and  railroad
ratemaking,   reform  minded  delegates   referred   to   the   rights  of   the  people   scores,









exercise  their  franchises  consistently  with  the  public  [well-being]  (Debates,  1870,
II-1656, Miller, 1971, 75-82).
22 Popular sovereignty was said to give the people, as the creators of corporations, the
power  to  control their  creation. As Reuben M. Benjamin, a Harvard educated lawyer
from Bloomington pointed out, a legislature, being a mere agent of the people, could





23 The   flip   side   of   this   belief   that   popular   sovereignty   justified   state   regulation   of
railroads and other corporations was reformers’ fear that the growing political power
of  wealthy  corporations   threatened  popular  sovereignty   itself.  This   fear  also   found




24 The   Illinois   Constitutional   Convention   adopted,   and   the   people   ratified,   reform
measures that gave the legislature broad powers to regulate railroads and warehouses.
In the following years the Illinois legislature passed several laws that were typical of
the  Granger   laws  enacted   in  other  Midwestern   states.  One  required   that  railroads
charge   uniform   rates   for   any   class   of   goods.   This   so-called   “anti-discrimination
provision” also specifically outlawed the practice of charging higher rates for a short
haul  from  a  town  to  a  center  of  commerce  than  for  a  long  haul  from  one  center  of
commerce   to  another.  A  second  act  created  a  Board  of  Warehouse  Commissioners,
which was given the power to prescribe maximum rates. A third set maximum rates for





authorities,  be   they   legislatures  or  commissions,  were  not  competent   to  determine
proper  rates  and  that  the  rates  they  set  would  be  unfair.5 The  resulting  rates,  they
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the  Granger   laws  violated  their  “exclusive  right  to   fix  the  rate  of  transportation.”7
Sometimes they insisted that they derived this right from their charters.8 But they also
believed  that  both  rate  regulation  and  anti-discrimination  provisions  violated  their
property rights. In this vein Robert Harris wrote, “They [the legislature] have made a





state   legislatures.   Railroad   historian,   Thomas   C.   Cochran   noted,   “Railroad   men
generally expected more favorable consideration from courts than from legislatures or
commissions,  more  from  judges  than  from  juries,  and  more  from  the  highest  courts
than from inferior  ones.”(Cochran, 1965, 191) Letters between these men reveal that









that  the  state’s  effort  to  legislate  rate  regulation  violated  the  guarantee  of  Article  I,
section  10  of   the  Constitution   that,  “no   state   shall  pass  any   law  …   impairing   the
obligation of contract.”
28 In  contract  clause  doctrine,  franchises  and  acts  of   incorporation  were  considered  a




that  Contract  Clause  doctrine   included  several  exceptions  to  the   inviolability  of  the
corporate   franchise.  The  most   important  of   these   recognized   the   state’s   right   to
include  a  provision   in   the  grant   reserving   to   itself   the  power   to   later   revise   the
agreement. 





tool   for  protecting  existing  corporations.   (Redfield,  1873,   I-50)  A  corporation  might
turn to the contract clause to claim its franchise was exclusive and the state could not
offer  a  new  grant  to  a  competitor.  It  might  claim  exemption  from  taxation,  or  from
subsequent  state  regulation.  It  was  so  useful  in  this  regard  that  some  contemporary
observers noted that the clause, more than any other provision of the Constitution, was
a source of excessive and angry controversy. Others charged that the Contract Clause
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was  the  bastion  of  corporate  privilege  and  a  shield  for  corporate  power.  (Ely,  2005,
397-99)  Despite   its  usefulness   in  any  particular  case,  however,   traditional  Contract












which   lawyers   for   the   corporate   elite   and   reformers  disagreed   at   the   very  most
fundamental level : the question of whether regulation was consistent with American
traditions and the American system of government. Where reformers maintained that
the   traditions   of   popular   sovereignty   and   democracy   justified   or   even   required
regulation, railroad leaders and their lawyers argued that the traditions of individual





the   Chicago   &   Northwestern’s   lawyers,   John   Cary,   maintained   that   the   Granger
legislation amounted to “communism pure and simple” which, if not checked, would




anything  but  radical.  Historian  George  H.  Miller  has  convincingly  demonstrated  that
the  call   for  reform  originated   in  the  business  communities  of  small  town  America.
Moreover, the theoretical underpinnings of reform can only be described as radical if
we  are  willing  to  describe  the  American  Constitution  itself  as  radical.  The  theory  of
inalienable  popular   sovereignty   that  was   so evident   in   the   Illinois  Constitutional
Convention derives from one of the most revered ideals of the American founding.16 
 
Popular Sovereignty and Rights of the Community in
Legal Doctrine
33 The   themes  of  popular   sovereignty  and   the  rights  of   the  community  were  clearly
common   in  political  discourse,   and   they  were   also well   entrenched   in  American
Constitutional doctrine. The most famous statement of this principle is found in Chief
Justice Taney’s opinion in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837). Rejecting the
Charles  River  Bridge  Company’s  claim  that   its  charter   implied  an  exclusive  right  to
operate a bridge over the Charles River, Taney reasoned that, “[T]he object and end of
all government is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by which
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it is established, and it can never be assumed that the government intended to diminish
its  power  of   accomplishing   the   ends   for  which   it  was   created.”17  For  Taney,   the
presumption in favor of the state was not just a matter of governmental power versus
individual liberty. It was also a matter of balancing property rights against the rights of
the   community.   “While   the   rights   of  private  property   are   sacredly   guarded,”  he
observed,  “we  must  not   forget   that   the  community  also  have  rights,  and   that   the
happiness and well being of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation.”18
34 The  notion   that   a   legislature   could  not   bargain   away   the   attributes   of   a   state’s
sovereignty also found expression in traditional constitutional law in cases interpreting




of  organized  society ;  and   that  any  contracts   to   that  end,  being  without  authority,
cannot   be   enforced  under   the  provisions   of   the   [contract   clause].”  Among   those
essential powers Cooley listed the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the
taxing  power.  Cooley  was  firm  that  a   legislature  could  not  bargain  away  the  police
power of the state even by an express grant. (Cooley, 1874, 283) 
35 That left open the question of whether economic regulation, especially regulation of
rates  and  prices,  fell  within  the  normal  police  powers  of  the  state.  The  history  of
economic regulation in early America makes it clear that most people and legislators
thought it was. Americans accepted the distinction between the right of property and
the   rules   of   conduct   under  which   property  may   be   used.   (Siegel,   1984,   197-98)
Licensing,  building  and   regulating  public  markets,   controlling  prices  or  quality  of
common  goods,  use  of  and  access   to  waterways,  eminent  domain   law,  public   trust
doctrine,  and   the   law  of  nuisance  are   common  examples  of   states   regulating   the
economy  in  the  public   interest.  And  the  list  goes  on.  Although  the  state’s  power  to
interfere  with property  was  not  unlimited,  nineteenth  century  Americans  certainly
considered regulation normal. (Scheiber 1971, Novak, 1996, Mark, 1999)
















applied  to  railroads  as  much  as  any  other  business  and,  although  many  states  gave
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in  the  Granger  Cases  were  among  the  most  distinguished   lawyers   in  America.  They
must have realized that under contract clause doctrine, as it stood, they really did not
have  very  good   cases.  Yet   they  pressed  on,   in   all   likelihood  because   they  had   a
purposeful  and  calculated  desire   to  change   the   status  of   the   law.  They  wanted   to
establish a doctrine that the Constitution guaranteed a fundamental right to be free of
the   type  of  price   regulations  created   in   the  Granger   laws.  Such  a  doctrine  would
remove the issue of regulation from the political process.21 Hindsight tells us that the
due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  rather  than  the  Contract  Clause,
would provide the vehicle for change.
39 The idea behind this theory was that government regulation denied businesses of both
their   property   and   their   liberty   and   thus   violated   the   Fourteenth   Amendment
guarantee that no state shall deny any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process   of   law.   The   tactic   of   using   the   Fourteenth  Amendment   as   a   barrier   to
government   regulation,  however,  was  novel   at   the   time.  Ratified   in   1868   in   the
aftermath of the Civil War, the amendment undoubtedly contained language sweeping
enough to be used for the railroad leaders’ purposes. Dissenting opinions in the The
Slaughterhouse  Cases  (1873),   the   first   case   to   interpret   the  new  Amendment,  did







No  pains  must  be  spared  upon  this  defense.  It  will  take  a  great  deal  of  time  and
much   labor,   perhaps  more   than   any   suit   the   company  has  had.  …  The   first




Proving Ground for a New Theory




charged  with  violating  an   Illinois   law  that  set  maximum  rates  that  elevators  could
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also  meant   to  protect  private  rights   from  arbitrary  government   interference.  This
theory  concentrated  on   the   substance  of   legislation   rather   than   the  procedure  by
which  the   law  was  enforced.  Substantive  due  process,  as   it  thus  came  to  be  called,









under   the   form  of   [legislative]  enactment   is  not  considered   the   law  of   the   land.”




state  court  opinions  to  support  their  argument.  The  most  well  known  of  these  was
Wynehamer  v.  New  York, an  1856  case  where  New  York’s  highest  court  ruled  that  a
















that  basic  contention.  The  Fifth  Amendment,   the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  and   the
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Contract Clause all contained provisions that protected property. The task that would





project  had   flooded   an   individual’s   adjacent   land,   they  offered   the  principle   that
destroying  the  value  of  property  constituted  confiscation.  (Goudy,  1975,  515,  Jewett,
1975, 558)28 Rate regulation, they said, had the same effect. John Jewett best captured
their   argument,   “It   is   not  merely   the   title   and   possession   of   property   that   the
Constitution  is  designed  to  protect,  but  along  with  this,  the  control  of  the  uses  and
income,  the  right  of  valuation  and  disposition,  without  which  property  ceases  to  be
profitable, or even desirable.” (Jewett, 1975, 557)
46 Jewett  and  Goudy’s  argument  embodied  an  attitude  toward  property  rights  that  one









483)   Rather   than   balancing   individual   property   rights   against   the   rights   of   the
community,  Jewett  postured  the  dispute  as  one  of   individual  property  rights  versus
government power. Legislation fixing prices represented an arbitrary and irresponsible
power,  he  said,  a  power  practically  to  annihilate  private  property  by  destroying  the
value of its use. (Jewett, 1975, 549)
47 To   the   extent   that   they  predicted   the  Court  would   invalidate   the  Granger   laws,
company attorneys had badly miscalculated. Writing for a 7 to 2 majority in Munn v.
Illinois, Chief Justice Waite upheld the Illinois warehouse regulations. Nevertheless, the
Court  had   faced   a   barrage   of   legal   argument   from   a   force   of   the  nation’s  most





wrote.  “Under  some  circumstances  they  may,  but  not  under  all.”29 The  Chief  Justice






personal  discomfort  with   the  absolutist  version  of  property  rights   that   Jewett  and
Goudy favored, and a keen appreciation of the ideals of popular sovereignty and the
rights of the people. 
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50 Waite’s reluctance to accept substantive due process and discomfort in accommodating
the  absolutist  view  of  property  rights  were  put  on  display  when  he  tried  to  explain
guidelines   for  applying   the  “affected  with  public   interest”   formula.  “Property  does
become clothed with public interest,” Waite wrote, “when used in a manner to make it
of   public   consequence,   and   affect   the   community   at   large.”31  So   broad  was   this
definition  that  it  caused  Justice  Stephen  Field,  a  champion  of  the  absolutist  view  of
property rights, to complain, “If this be sound law, if there be no protection, either in
the   principles   upon   which   our   republican   government   is   founded,   or   in   the
prohibitions  of  the  Constitution  against  such  invasion  of  private  rights,  all  property
and all business in the State are held at the mercy of a majority of its legislature.”32
51 Despite  this  strong   language,  even  Field  agreed  that  businesses  were  subject  to  the
police  power  of   the   state.  Unlike   the  majority,  however,  he  did  not  believe   that




use his own and not to injure his neighbor. On the basis of these principles he then
concluded that “The compensation which owners of property, not having any special
rights  or  privileges  from  the  government  in  connection  with  it,  may  demand  for  its
use…”  does  not  fall  within  that  power.34 Perhaps  the  most   important  factor   leading
Field  to  this  conclusion  was  the  presumption  from  which  he  started.  Constitutional
provisions   intended   for   the  protection  of  property,  he   insisted,  should  be   liberally




to   be   constitutional,”   he   wrote.   “The   court   ought   not   to   declare   one   to   be
unconstitutional  unless   it   is   clearly   so.   If   there   is  doubt,   the   express  will  of   the
legislature  should  be  sustained.”36 While  he  admitted   that  a  state  regulation  might
deprive   an   individual   of  property  without   due  process   of   law,  he  would  uphold
regulation  “…if  a  state of   facts  could exist  that  would   justify  such   legislation”  and
would  declare  a  regulation  void  only  “…   if  no  state  of  circumstances  could  exist to
justify such a statute.”37 
53 The majority’s presumption found solid roots in conventional Contract Clause doctrine
of  the  time.  It  could be  traced  back  to  the  majority  ruling  in  the  1837  Charles  River
Bridge Case, which was discussed earlier. There the Court ruled that, in interpreting
the meaning of a state granted charter, every legal presumption should be in favor of




regulates  the  conduct  of  its  citizens  one  towards  another,  and  the  manner  in  which




reasonable   rates   and   regulations   from   the   legislative   arena   to   the   judicial.   Field
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captured their position, and their distrust for the democratic process, in his dissent.




rights  would  be  adequately  protected  without   judicial   interference.  Of  course  Waite








Reaction and Response to Munn
56 For railroad leaders, who placed much more faith in appellate courts than in elected
legislatures, the majority decision inflicted a brutal blow. They had dreamed that the
decision  would  establish  an  unequivocal  right  to  be   free  of  government  regulation.
More realistically, they hoped it would produce a doctrine that the reasonableness of
government  rates and regulations was  inherently  a  judicial  question and that  courts





nation.”  (Jewett,  1975,  662)  Robert  Harris,  president  of  the  Chicago,  Burlington,  and
Quincy Railroad, also detected a dire omen in Munn. Ignoring the fact that the nation
was  still  in  the  throngs  of  an  economic  depression  that  began  in  1873  and  that  the





58 Reformers,  as  would  be  expected,   found   comfort   in   the  decision.  Two  years   later
delegates  to  the  California  constitutional  convention  pointed  to  Munn as  proof  that
they had the authority to regulate railroad rates and fares. (Debates, 1870, I-377) And,
even a decade later, a reform minded governor of Minnesota reminded the legislature
that  while  the  expediency  of  railroad  regulation  might  be  doubted,  the  right  of  the
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would  be  suspected  of  being  a  confiscation  of  property  that  violated  the  Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court would thus become the final arbitrator of the validity of rates.
Reflecting   a   distrust   of   the   democratic   process,   the   Court   would   start   from   a
presumption that  rate  regulation  violated  individual  liberty.  It  would  also  develop  a
narrow  definition  of   the  police  powers  of   the  state—that  range  of   legitimate  state
authority   to   interfere  with   liberty.   (Ely 1995,  57-127)  Because  of   its   emphasis  on












the  Court  quickly  moved  away   from   the  Munn doctrine.   It   is  also  commonly,  and
mistakenly,  believed  that  Munn  immediately  came  under  attack   from  attorneys   for
railroad, industrial, and financial interests. 
61 It was not until after four new justices joined the Court in the early 1880s, however,
that   attorneys   for   the   corporate   and   business   elite   increased   their   efforts.  They
achieved some measure of success in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad
(1886),  which  came   to  stand   for   the  proposition   that  corporations  are  persons   for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 Even then they failed to obtain the kind of
constitutional protections from government regulation that their clients wanted. 









1888   that   the   Court   subtly   revised  Munn’s   presumption   of   the   validity   of   state
legislation in the Minnesota Milk Rate Case of 1890. Writing for the majority, Justice
Samuel  Blatchford  said,  “The  question  of   the  reasonableness  of  a  rate  charged   for
transportation   by   a   railroad   company   is   eminently   a   question   for   judicial
investigation.”46 Then, in the 1898 case Smyth v. Ames, it added force to the idea that




that   it  violated   the  due  process   clause  of   the  Fourteenth  Amendment.   (Ely,  1995,
83-110)
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in   the  evolution  of   laissez-faire  constitutionalism.  But  analyzing  Munn  in   its  own
context puts a different spin on the majority decision. It demonstrates that the Munn




governed  society.  From  this  perspective  Munn,   instead  of  being  a  steppingstone  for
development of a doctrine that emphasized economic liberty, might better be described
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Walker suggested that bondholders seek injunctions in the federal courts against the company
and the railroad commission.
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Granger   cases   involving   corporations.   Field   actually   claims   that   the   majority   misses   an












“Public  Rights,”  supra  note  59  at  222-23 ;  Novak,  Peoples  Welfare,  supra  note  8,  at  19-20.  It  is
interesting that Shaw’s language begins as a statement very similar to what advocates of laissez-
faire constitutionalism would later use to describe the limits of property rights. That language,
which was captured by the Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as
not to injure the property of others), differs only in that it drops the reference to the rights of
the community. 
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régulation  de   l’économie  par   l’État.  Pour   les  plupart  des  historiens  et   juristes  aujourd’hui,   le
problème est de trouver le point d’équilibre entre liberté économique et droit de propriété d’une
part, et la puissance de l’État d’autre part. Pour eux, cette approche du problème est la tradition
dominante  en  histoire   constitutionnelle,  datant  de   l’ère   jacksonienne  au  moins.  Cet  article
montre au contraire qu’avant la fin des années 1880, le paradigme pour déterminer les limites
constitutionnelles  à   la  régulation  du  monde  économique  par   la  puissance  publique était   fort
différent.  Dans  son  premier  siècle,  la  Cour  suprême  pensait  cette  régulation  comme  équilibre
entre  droits  entrepreneuriaux  et  droits  de  la  communauté.  Bien  plus,  elle  tenait  pour  a priori
légitime   toute   régulation   économique   par   les   États   fédérés   parce   qu’elle   exprimait   la
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souveraineté  populaire.  Ce  n’est   qu’à   la   toute   fin   du  XIXe   siècle   que   cette   interprétation
traditionnelle  cède   le  pas  à  une  nouvelle,  qui  donne  de   la   liberté  d’entreprendre  un   statut
constitutionnel privilégié. Elle est le résultat d’efforts persistants d’avocats d’affaires, travaillant
pour   les  grandes  entreprises,  qui  ont   travaillé  à   trois   changements :   faire  de   la   régulation
économique   un   équivalent   d’une   confiscation   de   propriété ;   étendre   les   protections
constitutionnelles  des  entreprises ;  et  renverser  la  présomption  de  légitimité  de  la  régulation.
Mais, au moins jusqu’à la mort de son président Morrison R. Waite en 1888, la Cour suprême a







1880s   the  paradigm   for  determining the   constitution’s   limits  on  government   regulation  of





entrepreneurial  liberty  to  preferred  status  under  the  Constitution.  This  was  the  result  of  the
persistent  efforts  of  lawyers  for  the  corporate  elite,  who  aimed  to  produced  three  changes:  a
tendency   to   equate   regulation   of   business  with   confiscation   of   property;   a   trend   toward
expanding  the  constitutional  rights  afforded  to  corporations;  and  a  reversal  of  the  rule  that
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